The Political System of the Republic of Turkey, Past and Present

The first constitution of the Ottoman-Turkish Empire was adopted in 1876 – the Kânûn-ı Esâsî (Eng. Fundamental Law). In its history, Turkey has had four constitutions. They were adopted in 1921, 1924, 1961, and 1982, with the latter being presently in force. Nowadays, the creation of a new constitution is the main issue on Turkey’s political agenda. The government of Turkey and Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan want to amend the constitution, and envisage creating an executive presidential system (Tur. Başkanlık sistemi), similar to that of the Russian Federation and the United States. Critics are concerned about what Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s motivation may be. This article analyzes the historical roots of the constitution, its amendments, the presidential system in Turkey and the arguments of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) against the adoption of a presidential system. The key issues that the authors address are the changes that could be made under Turkey’s new constitution and whether all political power would be concentrated in president’s hands

Philosophical and Cultural Perspectives on Reading

Candor requires that I disclaim any real expertise in the educational specialty of reading instruction. This probably accounts for my writing about it with such sublime confidence. I do, however, believe that I know how to read. Moreover I have related to large numbers of people who are representative of many and diverse occupational and regional sub-cultures across the United States and Canada all of whom believe that they know how to read. These people typically exhibit a rather particular pattern of thinking styles. Since thinking is related to language and language is related to reading and since they all learned to read through processes and procedures that seem quite similar, it seems reasonable to wonder whether the way in which we learn to read partially influences the way in which we think.

Japan Self-Defence Forces - Origin and Development of the Institution

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the origins and evolution of Self-Defence Forces as an institution within the Japanese constitutional system. The analysis also aims to provide answers to the question of the compatibility of Jietai with the Japanese Constitution and its formal status. In order to address the research problem, we have decided to dedicate the first part to issues related to the constitutional principles of pacifism and anti-militarism. It is followed by the description of the process that led to the formation of Japanese Self-Defence Forces. We decided that the turning point of the analysis is the appointment of Liberal Democratic Party’s leader, Abe Shinzo, as the 96th Prime Minister of Japan (December 26, 2012). The reforms undertaken by the politician resulted in a rapid change in the character of Self-Defence Forces, putting an end to the hitherto functioning model of Jietai

Social Security as a Factor Contributing to the Evolution of the Political System in Poland after the Parliamentary Elections of 2015

W debacie publicznej dość często występującym problemem jest rola i zakres działań państwa w obszarze bezpieczeństwa społecznego. Związane to jest zarówno z postawą obywateli, jak i wykorzystywaniem haseł społecznych, szczególnie w kampaniach wyborczych. Można wręcz powiedzieć, że w trakcie walki wyborczej następuje pewnego rodzaju wyścig polegający na tym, które obietnice socjalne trafią do przekonania wyborców, dzięki czemu polityk/partia polityczna osiągnie sukces wyborczy. Tym samym, odwołując się do hasła bezpieczeństwa społecznego, manipuluje się danymi ekonomicznymi, ale przede wszystkim pozostawia się poza sferą refleksji wpływ obietnic wyborczych ze sfery społecznej (zazwyczaj zawężanej do socjalnej) na ewolucję systemu politycznego. Niewątpliwie jest on znaczny i bardzo często lekceważony, czego przykładem może być Rzeczpospolita Polska po 2015 roku.The role and scope of the state’s activities in the field of social security are quite often problematic. This is related both to the attitude of citizens and to the use of social slogans, particularly in election campaigns. One could say that the electoral struggle is a kind of race, in which the winner is the politician or party whose promises are best suited to their voters. In order to address social security, politicians manipulate economic data. But above all, the influence of electoral promises (usually narrowed down to matters of welfare) on the evolution of the political system is not considered, despite the fact that this influence is considerable and very often neglected, as exemplified by the situation in the Republic of Poland after 2015

FORMS OF PROTEST IN LATVIA DURING THE PANDEMIC VERSUS THE ACTIVITY OF THE POLICE

The COVID-19 pandemic, which broke out on an unprecedented scale in 2020, forced the public authorities to impose a series of restrictions and limitations on constitutional rights and freedoms, which provoked strong reactions, particularly in the democratic world, and encouraged social unrest. The speed of the measures, their scope and the degree of negligence, which undoubtedly affected the lives of millions of people, strengthened social resistance. The research problem in this paper concerns the influence of the pandemic-related restrictions introduced in Latvia on the mobilisation and demobilisation of demonstrators and the evaluation of the methods used by the Latvian police in the conditions of civil disorder caused by these restrictions. The aim of this paper is to examine the violent acts committed by the demonstrators and the forms of protest they used, as well as to analyse the actions of the officers of the services responsible for securing the demonstrations. The author sought answers to two main research questions: What actions did demonstrators take during the pandemic in Latvia? How did the security services ensure the safety of the demonstrations and what methods did they use? The study used institutional and legal analysis as well as qualitative source analysis. It also used the method of content analysis, mainly of messages and announcements related to the behaviour of protesters and law enforcement agencies during the period in question

The Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The organisation of work, competences and legal status of deputies

Zgodnie z Konstytucją Republiki Kazachstanu z 30 sierpnia 1995 r. Kazachstan jest państwem o ustroju prezydenckim. Władza wykonawcza w Kazachstanie jest egzekutywą dwuczłonową, tj. składa się z wybieranej na okres siedmiu lat w wyborach powszechnych, równych, bezpośrednich i tajnych głowy państwa – prezydenta republiki, oraz odpowiedzialnego przed prezydentem i parlamentem rządu. W oparciu o postanowienia rozdziału 12. Konstytucji Republiki Kazachstanu z 28 stycznia 1993 r. jednoizbowy parlament występujący pod nazwą „Rada Najwyższa” stanowił jedyny organ przedstawicielski i ustawodawczy republiki. Dwa lata później, w sierpniu 1995 r., w trakcie referendum ogólnokrajowego biorący w nim udział obywatele opowiedzieli się za utworzeniem parlamentu dwuizbowego. Organizację i działalność władzy ustawodawczej, jej strukturę i kompetencje, reguluje Konstytucja Republiki Kazachstanu, Ustawa Konstytucyjna № 2529 z 16 października 1996 r. zatytułowana O parlamencie Republiki Kazachstanu i statusie jego deputowanych oraz inne akty, m.in. regulaminy parlamentarne obu izb, czy też przyjęty podczas wspólnej sesji obu izb parlamentu Republiki Kazachstanu w dniu 20 maja 1996 r. Regulamin parlamentu Republiki Kazachstanu. Jak przewiduje art. 49 konstytucji, dwuizbowy parlament Republiki Kazachstanu jest najwyższym przedstawicielskim organem Republiki wykonującym funkcje ustawodawcze. Parlament Republiki Kazachstanu jest klasycznym przykładem legislatywy biernej, zdominowanej przez prezydenta, prezydencką partię polityczną, i posiadającej niski poziom autonomii. Podsumowując, warto odnotować, że parlamenty są niewątpliwie instytucjami, które należy traktować jako organy sprzyjające stabilizacji systemu politycznego. Stabilność taka zaś – zdaniem Philipa Nortona i Davida M. Olsona – może zostać osiągnięta wtedy, gdy istnieje równowaga legitymizacji wewnątrz systemu.According to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 30 August 1995, Kazakhstan has a presidential form of government. The executive power in Kazakhstan has two branches, i.e. it consists of the head of state – the President of the Republic – who is elected for the period of seven years in general, equal, direct and secret elections, and of the government, which is accountable to the President and the Parliament. On the basis of the provisions of chapter 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 28 January 1993, the unicameral parliament called the „Supreme Council” was the only representative and legislative body of the Republic. Two years later, in the referendum held in August 1995, citizens voted for the establishment of a bicameral parliament. The work and activity of the legislative branch, its structure and powers, is regulated by the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, The Constitutional Law № 2529 of 16 October 1996 entitled On the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Status of Its Deputies as well as other acts, such as parliamentary rules of procedure of both chambers or the Regulations of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted by both chambers of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan at their joint session As stipulated in art. 49 of the Constitution, the bicameral Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the highest representative body of the Republic performing legislative functions. The Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan is a classic example of a passive legislature, which is dominated by the president, the presidential political party, and which has a low level of autonomy. To sum up, it must be noted that parliaments are undoubtedly institutions which should be considered as the bodies conducive to the stability of a political system. According to P. Norton and D.M. Olson, such stability can be achieved when there is the balance of legitimisation within the system.on 20 May 1996.